Neoliberal Shock, Infrastructure Disruption, and Restructuring in Chile by Sanzana Calvet, M & Castan Broto, V
Calvet, Broto  | Neoliberal Shock10 
 11Critical Planning Volume 22
Neoliberal Shock, Infrastructure 
Disruption, and Restructuring 
in Chile
Vanesa Castán Broto 
University College London
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1. Introduction
We argue here for the need to redefine the concept of crisis and the consequences 
of doing so. The question that signaled our point of departure was: is it possible 
to learn from political crisis in relation to the management of materials and 
infrastructures? We started from the idea that both crises and the shock policies 
meant to overcome them were being considered generative moments in which 
infrastructure could be reconceptualized away from capitalist models of resource 
transformation (Castan Broto et al. 2014). A different perspective arises in light 
of Naomi Klein’s “Shock Doctrine” theory, whereby destruction and crisis are 
pushed alongside neoliberal policies so that society adapts to the ever more ex-
ploitative demands of capitalism. Rather than exposing the faults of the system, 
crises and shocks can actually be a mechanism for its reproduction. 
Our objective is to focus on the genealogy of material transformations that ac-
companied the implementation of shock policies by the military regime in Chile 
and how they evolved in the transition to a post-dictatorial period. While de-
bates on the impacts of Chilean neoliberal reforms in infrastructure have been 
centered on changes in their financing, coverage, and management, this paper 
explores the political economy of infrastructure shock and resilience in a context 
of political and economic crisis from the 1973 coup d’état onwards, stressing 
the diversity of scales involved in the development of infrastructure and urban 
restructuring (Soja, Morales, and Goetz Wolff 1983). By drawing attention to 
the political context of regime crises and shock policies, we aim to contribute to 
politicizing the analysis of the role of urban infrastructure disruption, restruc-
turing, and resilience, as well as their impacts (in the case of Santiago de Chile). 
With this, we undertake to participate in the debates over strategies for the neo-
liberalization of the urban realm.
The hypothesis we develop in this paper is that, in the case of Santiago de Chile, 
infrastructure shock, disruption, and resilience were crucial mechanisms in the 
neoliberal project of sociopolitical disciplining and reconfiguration. We suggest 
that shock relates to an attempt to control different material spheres, to disci-
pline both population and resources to adapt to the new regime, while resilience 
refers to attempts to seek regime stabilization under a neoliberal hegemony.
Our position is informed by the following approaches. By considering infra-
structure crises as key moments in which the social and political configurations 
become visible in the materiality of the city, we explicitly draw on Stephen Gra-
ham’s (2009) critical geography of urban everyday life dependence on infrastruc-
ture and the effect of its disruption, as moments in which social and political 
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relations become visible, as Graham developed these ideas in Disrupted Cities. 
Our emphasis on Graham’s notion of disruption of infrastructure networks as 
instrumental in controlling the flows of cities is linked to the work of scholars 
developing urban political ecologies of infrastructure. We consider the relevance 
of this social and material mechanism of power in regulating political modes 
through material and symbolic flows, as in Swyngedouw’s (2006) proposal to 
conceptualize cities as socio-natural assemblages. We also attempt to analyze 
these changes in the socio-natural flows in the context of the processes of neolib-
eralization of infrastructure and nature, as studied by Bakker (2005). 
Our methodology proposes a historical analysis of the political context of the 
development of urban infrastructure in Santiago de Chile, in combination with 
an examination of the economic and social effects of shock policies and neoliber-
alization, through the scrutiny of the literature, official documents, press review, 
and grey literature. 
First, we establish how the shock resolution to the political crisis in 1973 initi-
ated a process of urban infrastructure restructuring in Santiago, organized by 
principles of a National Security Doctrine (Pion-Berlin 1988), thus affecting 
the biophysical and social flows of the city; this disciplining was followed by 
the imposition of a program of neoliberalization of economy and society. Next, 
we examine the impact of the regime transition in unleashing infrastructure 
investment and the innovations in neoliberal governance by the new civilian 
authorities that led to a new wave of neoliberalization of the urban infrastruc-
ture and services, particularly focusing on the case of the transportation sector 
reforms and their urban and sociopolitical effects. Finally, along with examining 
our hypothesis in the light of our findings, we reflect on the implications of the 
political context in the analysis of the neoliberalization of urban infrastructure.
2. Infrastructure Shock to Discipline Urban Flows
The 1973 coup d’état in Chile and the resultant military government had pro-
found and long-term effects on the way the country’s infrastructure was con-
ceived, financed, built, and used. Once the military takeover succeeded, the sta-
bilization process did not just go back to the previous institutional framework 
and policies, cleansed now of leftist militants or sympathizers. Instead, the mili-
tary orchestrated a violent social and economic restructuring by dismantling and 
reframing institutions and infrastructure, under a National Security Doctrine 
and a neoliberal economic paradigm. The neoliberal reforms did not follow a 
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linear development, and along with historical vicissitudes the neoliberal agenda 
had to deal with the “dependence path” of the previous state-based model. 
Since the first moment of the coup, the new authorities treated infrastructure 
as a strategic field for the country takeover and redevelopment under a new re-
gime, a tool for economic recovery and an indicator of the success of neoliberal 
reforms. Among the first measures of the military Junta, the generals conducted 
the dismantling and banning of old institutions, and the totalitarian control of 
movement and speech. A thorough reorganization of material and social flows 
ensued to reinforce the military and political control, reactivate the economy 
and restart—under new rules—a few chosen institutions of social life (Garre-
ton1998). As those policies focused on the dismantling of the old regime and its 
infrastructure, they also worked at securing the territories and urban spaces to 
allow the building of a new social project, under nationalist slogans exhorting 
people to rebuild the country. 
Nevertheless, while the first wave of neoliberal reforms in Chile ripened in the 
late 1970s, the coup and the military despotic rule can hardly be separated from 
the neoliberal shock treatment and the building of the sociopolitical conditions 
for the neoliberal experiment (Klein 2008). As Foxley (1982) argues, after the 
overthrow of the socialist government, the totalitarianism of the regime cannot 
be explained only by the military character of the rulers, but also by the needs of 
a radical neoliberal restructuring of economy, state, and society. 
In the military takeover, the main Chilean cities were treated as a theatre of war. 
A form of disciplinary urbanism shaped the reorganization of space (Rodriguez 
and Rodriguez 2009). Infrastructure—and urban infrastructure in particular—
became both a target and a weapon in the armed conflict, and played a crucial 
role in symbolizing this narrative of “shock treatment”. Following a military 
logic, the cities’ main infrastructure—including roads, water and energy utili-
ties, public buildings, commerce, factories, and communication networks and 
hubs—was either controlled, occupied, shut down, destroyed, or given a new 
symbolic function.  
The repressive use of infrastructure did not end with the military takeover on 
September 11, 1973. A new framework for mobility and social behavior was set 
by the establishment of a state of siege on the day of the coup, and by a curfew 
that—with some periods of exception—lasted from 1973 to 1987. The military 
occupation established a new system of control of public and private spaces and 
infrastructure all over the country, during the first days by the use of a coalition 
of pro-putsch radios and newspapers to send official communiqués and warn-
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ings, and later also by the coverage of censored television activity (Garretón et al. 
1998). In Santiago and other main cities, infrastructure was fitted with fixed and 
mobile surveillance and control mechanisms, such as road diversions and check 
points in all major streets, roads and bridges, factories, energy, and communica-
tions infrastructure (Rojas 1988). The municipal authorities were dissolved by 
a decree even before the formal dissolution of the Congress, and the political 
parties and new authorities were designated months later by the military au-
thorities. As social organizations were also banned, the urban space underwent a 
reorganization by the setting of new militarily conceived administrative bound-
aries, and neighborhoods were reorganized into numbered units, coherent with 
the physical and material military control of space, where the population was 
under new scrutiny and control (Rodriguez and Rodriguez 2009, 11). 
The reorganization of the use of infrastructure considered also a new hierarchy 
of places with material and symbolic implications. Some buildings were totally 
or partially destroyed, like La Moneda, the presidential palace, emptied in 1973, 
which was restored only in 1981. Other infrastructures were simply abandoned, 
as was the largest Chilean hospital, built by Allende’s government in a popular 
area of Santiago, which to this date remains unoccupied (La Nación2013). The 
coup led also to the turning of infrastructure use for alternative purposes, such as 
the use of the National Stadium and the Chile Stadium as detention camps. In 
some cases, these reconfigurations had longer duration, such as the UNCTAD 
building which was turned into the military Junta headquarters, as well as “terror 
infrastructure” such as military barracks turned into permanent prison camps in 
the Tres Alamos and Cuatro Alamos compounds, or a network of former civilian 
houses used as undercover torture and extermination houses, as in the case of the 
Villa Grimaldi compound (Aguilar 2003). 
By imposing a new moral order of “cleanness,” the Junta sought to control both 
the infrastructure and the people who used it. The instruments of control ex-
tended to individuals’ appearance, banning long hair and beards for men and 
wearing trousers for women, as well as censoring (and promoting a self-censor-
ing of ) any spoken or written language perceived as inappropriate, “political,” or 
“extremist” (Errázuriz 2009). A discourse of social and political “cleansing” was 
accompanied by organic metaphors of the military rulers calling to “extirpate the 
Marxist cancer” and “heal the poisoned body of the country” (cited in Errázuriz 
2009, 142). 
A resignification of infrastructure was pursued by changing the names of streets 
(the modernist “Nueva Providencia” turned into September 11 Avenue), build-
ings (the UNCTAD conference building—Centro Cultural Gabriela Mistral—
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was renamed Diego Portales, a historical icon of Chilean autocratic and elitist 
government), as well as self-governed popular settlements originated from oc-
cupations (the “New Havana” camp was renamed as “New Dawn” by a mili-
tary decree [Cofré 2007, 228]). This fits well into the notion of what Errázuriz 
(2009) considers an “aesthetic-cultural coup”—a military breakdown of the sub-
jectivity developed during the rise of popular and leftist influence. This process 
included both the destruction and the resignification of symbols of the previous 
era and was extended to the appearance of infrastructures, for example, through 
the cleaning of walls and covering of the many urban murals painted by social 
organizations and artists (such as a recently uncovered mural by prestigious artist 
Matta in La Granja población), the destruction of statues (like the Che Guevara 
monument in La Florida), and new rules for the colors houses should be paint-
ed, avoiding black, red, and other tones the military considered as too “violent” 
(Errázuriz 2009, 142).
Along with usage and signification shifts, the military regime attempted to build 
its own mode of infrastructure as a reflection of social order and capitalist mod-
ernization. To achieve that goal, the regime relied on two mechanisms: first, 
directing the building of infrastructure by the state to pave the way to a new 
economic model of private exports and deregulated financial flows; and sec-
ond, the liberalization of built environment construction to unleash the market 
forces that would develop new productive, commercial, residential, and service 
infrastructures. As we point out in the following sections, this second moment 
was never fully accomplished by the military regime, but rather by its center-left 
opposition once it came to power. 
3. Cycles of Infrastructure Neoliberalization
At this point, we would like to contextualize the political stage on which the 
transformation of urban infrastructure developed. Before the military coup, 
the American-controlled international development institutions, such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), had engaged in a financial boycott, ceasing 
loans to Allende’s socialist government. In 1974, after the military coup, the 
new government received new development loans from these institutions, with 
long-term credit provision for hundreds of millions of dollars (Sigmund 1977), 
70% of them directed to sectors with intensive investments in infrastructure, 
mostly highway and road construction (29%), energy (16%), public housing 
(15%), water supply (6%), and urban roads and transport (4%) (IDB 2013a; 
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2013b; World Bank 2013). These international loans were particularly sensitive 
to the state of relationships between General Pinochet and the U.S. administra-
tions (Figure 1), following a “carrot and stick” approach, and linked to different 
cycles of U.S. foreign policy in stabilizing, shattering, or dismissing the dictato-
rial regime. 
The original structural reforms in Chile under a neoliberal ideology were a set 
of radical neoclassic economic policies, implemented from the early years of the 
military government in different intensities and modalities. The neoliberal re-
forms were inspired in the works of a group of Chilean economists who studied 
at and maintained close ties with Chicago University, and who later occupied 
relevant governmental places in the implementation of the policies (De Cas-
tro 1992). Their main goal was to dismiss the Keynesian state developmentalist 
model consolidated in Chile since the 1940s and to set an economic policy cen-
tered on “macro-adjustment, economic liberalization and privatization of both 
state-owned enterprises and social services” (Solimano 2009, 4).
Figure 1.Political context of the World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank loans for infrastructure to Chile (in millions of U.S. dollars). Authors’ elab-
oration from IDB (2013a; 2013b); World Bank (2013) and Garretón (1994).
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2013b; World Bank 2013). These international loans were particularly sensitive 
to the state of relationships between General Pinochet and the U.S. administra-
tions (Figure 1), following a “carrot and stick” approach, and linked to different 
cycles of U.S. foreign policy in stabilizing, shattering, or dismissing the dictato-
rial regime. 
The original structural reforms in Chile under a neoliberal ideology were a set 
of radical neoclassic economic policies, implemented from the early years of the 
military government in different intensities and modalities. The neoliberal re-
forms were inspired in the works of a group of Chilean economists who studied 
at and maintained close ties with Chicago University, and who later occupied 
relevant governmental places in the implementation of the policies (De Cas-
tro 1992). Their main goal was to dismiss the Keynesian state developmentalist 
model consolidated in Chile since the 1940s and to set an economic policy cen-
tered on “macro-adjustment, economic liberalization and privatization of both 
state-owned enterprises and social services” (Solimano 2009, 4).
In 1975 the military government launched a radical macro-economic and fiscal 
adjustment, also called fiscal shock, that was set to end public debt, reduce infla-
tion, and stimulate private capital formation (Davis 2003). This shock included 
measures such as cuts in the governmental budget, liberalization of most of the 
previous controlled prices, privatization of previously nationalized companies, 
and liberalization of the exchange rate. The immediate impact of these policies 
was a severe reduction of national GDP and public budget in the following 
years, which decreased governmental investments in infrastructure without re-
placing them with new private investments (Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis 
2004). Within this context of investment shortage and shock fiscal policies, the 
military regime re-prioritized expenditures on infrastructure, abandoning poli-
cies of social welfare improvement and state-owned production. The new regime 
focused on spending its scarce resources to boost infrastructure oriented towards 
the private export sector and to modernize the central business districts of the 
main cities, particularly in Santiago (Rodriguez and Rodriguez 2009).
Then, from 1979 to 1981, during an intense but short economic recovery de-
rived from export growth and the expansion of private debt, the legal and insti-
tutional foundations of the new political and economic order were set, with the 
enactment of a new constitution drawn under both neoliberalism and National 
Security Doctrine (Silva 1991). In this period, the regime reshaped the very 
foundations of the political and infrastructural systems through several Organic 
Laws and Supreme Decrees. Some principles that would have a high impact on 
the development of urban infrastructure remained in the constitution, such as 
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the state’s subsidiary role, the reassurance of property rights, and the economic 
freedom granted to capital (Lüders 1991). Among the most important changes 
due to their long-term impact on infrastructure on a city scale were: the 1980-
81 “municipalization” transferring public services from the central state to the 
municipalities, including education, health, and waste systems, without any 
fundamental increase of resources and attributions, which led to a spatial and 
social differentiation between a premium public infrastructure in the wealthy 
municipalities and a dilapidated one in the poorer ones (Boisier 2000); the 1981 
market liberalization of health and educational services provision, allowing new 
profit-led private schools and universities to freely compete for public subsidies 
for operation and infrastructure, leading to currently more than half of the pri-
mary and secondary students in Chile attending private schools (Fundación Sol 
2011); and the 1981 privatization of the pension system, which developed large 
funds administrated by profit-led private entities utilized to finance large private 
infrastructure projects (Moguillansky 1997).  
While some of those policies were immediately implemented, others had to wait: 
a new economic crisis in 1982 hit the country and the state intervened with 
pragmatism to rescue the bank sector, dismissing the ministers who exposed a 
neoliberal ideology. From 1975 to 1984 the total investment in infrastructure, 
considered as a rate of the national GDP or as a rate of the Gross Capital For-
mation, was lower than the previous (1960-1973) and following periods (1984-
1996) (Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis 2004, 267-268). This was also true for 
the rates of public investment in productive infrastructure (Cerda 2012). 
From the second half of the 1980s, the Chilean economy recovered from the 
debt crisis and displayed a remarkable cycle of economic growth that has lasted 
until today, with the interregnum of the 1999-2001 “Asian” and 2008-2009 
“sub-prime”crises (Schmidt Hebbel 2012). The economic model in which this 
growth is based on the private-sector-led exports of commodities, minerals, and 
agro-forestry goods and the increasing development of a tertiary sector of ser-
vices, with high levels of participation of foreign investment and multinational 
firms (Fazio 1997). Then, from 1985 to 1989 the military government retook 
the neoliberal agenda and privatized the state-owned energy and communica-
tions companies, first calling for a “popular capitalism” by selling shares to their 
workers and then opening the companies to large private capital, as in the case 
of telecommunications, electricity generation, electricity distribution, steel pro-
duction, mining, pharmaceuticals, and airlines (Marcel 1989).
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4. The Political Transition to Democracy and a New   
     Infrastructure Restructuring
The political transition towards a democratically elected government introduced 
a scenario of stabilization and an international overture that boosted economic 
growth and urban infrastructure development, by combining both traditional 
and innovating modalities of private participation.
After a failed communist guerrilla attack against General Pinochet in 1986, 
Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Socialist-inspired parties engaged 
in new talks with factionsa of the military regime supporters, under the pressure 
of the U.S. Department of State, leading the opposition to accept and partici-
pate in the 1988 regime Referendum (Cavallo, Salazar, and Sepulveda 1997). 
With the triumph of the “NO” vote against the continuity of General Pinochet, 
a “pact of transition”was set between the democratic opposition (and future gov-
ernment), the dictatorship supporters, and the military. The core of the pact, 
actively shaped by the main political, economic, and intellectual factions, was 
the acceptance of a new democratic cycle based on a totalitarian-made constitu-
tion and on maintaining the economic model (Garretón 1994). 
In the 1990s the successive civilian governments deepened private participation 
in infrastructure development, combining more liberalization with new regu-
lations. The main consensual goal of public and private actors was to recover 
infrastructure investment to overcome a “bottleneck for the economic growth” 
(Moguillansky 1997, 8). With strong international support for the democrati-
cally elected government and open-market economy, investment (either loans or 
direct foreign investment) increased far beyond the averages of the military re-
gime (Cerda 2012). Foreign direct investment in sectors with intensive develop-
ment of urban infrastructure experienced a boom, particularly sectors of energy, 
gas and water supply, communications, and transport, which shifted from less 
than a billion U.S. dollars for the whole 1974-1989 dictatorial period to nearly 
$30 billion in the post-dictatorial period (CIE 2013).
While reforms during the totalitarian period had emphasized liberalization and 
deregulation, assuming that market rationalities would lead automatically to 
private-led investments in infrastructure provision, in the post-dictatorial period 
policies tended to combine privatization and liberalization with re-regulation of 
private activity. These policies aimed to boost undeveloped markets, support pri-
vate investments, and guide them in an active way, all of which strengthened the 
framework for the expansion of the private sector and attracted foreign capital, 
leading to a boom in infrastructure modernization and the urban built environ-
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ment. Also, while during the military regime investments in infrastructure were 
mainly made directly or indirectly by the state (either by direct construction and 
management or by transferring assets to private companies at subsidized prices), 
since 1990 investment in major infrastructure in Chile has been done by the 
private sector, and in most cases, by foreign companies backed by investment 
funds. These private investments have ranged from privatization subjected to a 
new regulatory framework, to the liberalization of the market and the removal of 
access barriers for new service providers, paving the way for concessions (Engel 
et al. 2011). 
In privatizations, there was an increasing role for the local stock market and for-
eign companies with headquarters abroad (Marcel 1989). Also, the new center-
left governments extensively implemented schemes of Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) for infrastructure projects, many of them under the modality of conces-
sions. From 1996 to 2006, more than fifty large-scale projects were developed in 
the sectors of highways, urban highways, airports, prisons, dams, Metro stations, 
and public service infrastructures, totaling more than US$11.3 billion (Engel et 
al. 2009). 
Where privatization or concession was not possible, the state maintained a mini-
mal operational expenditure, leading to the degradation of the service, as in the 
case of the rail system (Cerda 2012). In some cases, this de-investment led to a 
further privatization, as in the case of the water companies. Although the frame-
work for water liberalization and privatization was set in the early 1980s, the 
state-owned monopoly of water and sanitation utilities was privatized only in 
the 2000s, by new modalities of PPP and concessions (Fischer and Serra 2007). 
This privatization led to a substantial increase in the rate of water treatment and 
improvement of the environmental quality of surface water, as well as a price rise 
and concentration of utility ownership among a few private actors (Baer 2014).
Privatization also entailed the liberalization of water provision in the areas of ur-
ban expansion, where new medium-size water companies filled the voids left by 
the large and regulated utilities and started to operate with higher prices, lower 
reliability, and fewer regulations (Tolorza 2011).
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5. Transport Modernization in Santiago de Chile as a Case  
    of Urban Infrastructure Restructuring
Changes in transport policies and mobility infrastructure are one of the clearest 
examples of how the new modalities of investment in infrastructure impacted 
Santiago. In the 1970s, a State Company of Collective Transport (ETC) ran 
most part of the bus transport system in the city. The neoliberal reforms first cut 
subsidies in 1975 and liberalized the entry rules for new operators, and in 1981 
the company was dissolved (Thomson 1992). Further steps were taken in 1983 
with the liberalization of fees, and in 1988 with the end of restrictions for bus 
operators. This market take over led to an increase of inequalities in the quality 
of the services and prices; fragmentation of bus owners and the formation of 
cartels; and a rapid increase of air pollution, congestion, and accidents due to the 
drivers’fierce competition for passengers. In this case deregulation did not mean 
purely lack of regulation, but the administration’s abandonment of the public in-
terest in favor of the hegemony of private industry, benefitting those who could 
afford the services (Figueroa 1990). What emerged was not chaos, but a more 
segregated and unequal reorganization of Santiago’s urban space.
In order to tackle these issues, the civil authorities in the 1990s progressively in-
creased the requirements for bus fleet modernization, and constrained the entry 
of new operators by enhancing the power of bus owners’ associations. After a bus 
owners’ strike, the government created the Transantiago, a new transport system 
inspired by the Colombian Transmilenio bus systems but adapted to the local 
conditions of administrative fragmentation and neoliberal policies. The architec-
ture of this system was designed to be managed under technocratic parameters 
and technological advancements, concentrating bus ownership with a few very 
large operators, while the financial management was given to a consortium of 
private banks and the subway company (Metro). The focus was to reduce the 
bus fleet and create a self-sufficient and profitable system, but itsfull implemen-
tation in 2007 lead to the collapse of the whole transport system (Figueroa and 
Orellana 2007). From the initial investment in the Transtantiago infrastructure, 
estimated in some US$800 million, only US$100 million were state funds di-
rected to the bus system, in contrast to the generous public investment in the 
Metro system, or the subsidies to the concessions of urban highways for the 
private sector, around US$2 billion in each case (Figueroa and Orellana 2007). 
The Transantiago failure caused protests and political problems, along with a 
huge and continuous flow of state cash to keep the system running, with few 
substantial improvements. 
On the other hand, the Metro appears to be a resilient project and was the only 
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state urban company to survive, through its immense political impact and its 
new adaptation to neoliberalization. No wonder; since the inauguration of the 
first Metro station in 1975 by General Pinochet (La Cuarta2012), every inaugu-
ration is considered of major political and electoral relevance, and also welcomed 
by the real estate and development industries, which benefit from (untaxed) 
valuation of their properties (Tomic and Trumper 2006). Today, the Metro has 
seven lines (two under construction) and 123 stations (fifteen under construc-
tion), but this has come at a much higher comparative cost than a properly 
funded bus system (Figueroa and Orellana 2007).
One of the most notorious changes in Chilean transport infrastructure is the 
new road system. The private ownership of a car has symbolized social mobil-
ity and prosperity, and Santiago’s motorization rate increased by 378% from 
1975 to 2012 (reaching an average of 239 cars per 1,000 inhabitants), while the 
population grew by 64% in the same period (SECTRA2012; INE 2012). At the 
same time, these rate averages hide an increasing inequality between the poorest 
and richest municipalities and householders: while the wealthiest municipality 
in Santiago has a motorization rate of 1,032 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants, the 
poorest one shows a rate of 80 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants (INE 2012). As 
the flow of cars has increased the congestion and the public bills for road con-
struction and maintenance, the civilian governments have promoted the expan-
sion and modernization of Santiago’s road system through mechanisms of Build, 
Operate, and Transfer (BOT) concessions of highways. While in 1996 more 
than 2,460 km of highways were concessions, urban highways proved to be 
particularly efficient at attracting private investment in infrastructure, from both 
the privatized Chilean workers’ pension funds and the larger transnational Tool 
Road Companies (Tomic and Trumper 2009). This is not a case of a pure free 
market policy: to make the tender more attractive, the state offered assurance of 
revenues, large subsidies for the initial stages of construction, a quasi-monopo-
listic market, prizes for achieved goals, and conditions of contract renegotiation 
largely favorable to the private companies (Engel et al. 2009). Public incentives 
were thus directed to the development of these projects, rather than to a public 
transport system. From 1996 to 2010, almost a third of the total infrastructure 
concession investments were made in urban highways, with only a small share 
(1.5%)dedicated to improving the Transantiago road infrastructure (MOP cited 
Cerda 2012:Anexo V).   
Beyond the investment, this new private road system (see Figure 2) works as a 
new premium infrastructure network (Link 2008) that connects the main social 
and economic activities, easing the displacement of private car owners from the 
high-income residential districts to the CBD and peripheral entrepreneurial dis-
tricts (Allard 2002). 
Calvet, Broto  | Neoliberal Shock24 
However, the success of the concessions was not without conflicts and difficul-
ties. With the failure of the Transantiago system, private car use was perceived by 
many citizens as the immediate solution for mobility. In a context of econom-
ic growth and credit access, the city’s road network collapsed with more cars. 
Today, urban highways have become an expensive congestion trap at the peak 
hours, with drivers paying to spend hours trapped between home and work/
study places, a problem that is being addressed by the building of new private 
concessions for more highways and tunnels (Argandoña 2011).  
Also, urban highway projects were continuously contested by local conflicts, as 
in the case of the Costanera Norte highway, a project of a 33 km express highway 
that developed all along the Mapocho River, linking Santiago’s high income dis-
trict with the city Central Business District and the international airport. When 
initiated in 1996, the projects triggered the opposition of communities in their 
way, challenging its viability (Sepulveda and Du Monceau 1998). In the end, a 
coalition of professional classes, activists and groups of local merchants did not 
stop the project but succeeded in bringing about substantial changes and mitiga-
tion efforts that cost the state an additional US$70 million, and raised debate 
about the concession policy of urban infrastructure (Poduje 2007).
Figure 2. River and motorway in Santiago. Photograph: C. Olivares (2012).
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In low-income neighborhoods the impacts of the new highway projects were 
evictions, segregation, and nuisances due to the length of the construction time 
and the techniques used. Despite the passivity of the local authorities, some local 
communities contested the projects, as in the case of the construction of a new 
track of a highway concession connecting Santiago with the southern areas of 
the metropolitan region through the La Pintana and La Granja municipalities 
(SUR 2011). In those territories, affected neighbors and local ecology organiza-
tions contested the impact of the works and the evictions and expropriations, 
seeking mitigation and compensation. Although those neighbors and munici-
palities benefited from several measures of mitigation, compensation, and proj-
ect improvements (amounting to about US$25 million) until 2009, in 2011 the 
inauguration of the last track of the highway triggered a new wave of protests 
from neighbors demanding improvement in pedestrian security (SUR 2011).
In a different context, since 2009, within the affluent municipalities of La Reina 
and Las Condes, neighbors and community organizations have been oppos-
ing the extension of the city’s main highway ring. Community leaders grouped 
into anti-growth social organizations demanding new technical solutions, such 
as large-scale tunnels to avoid evictions and local environmental impacts that 
would make the project non-viable without even larger public subsidies. They 
also contested the related municipal general plans to modify land use and in-
crease building density in the area of the new highway, which would further 
exacerbate road congestion (SUR 2011). This social activism has raised still un-
answered questions on the limits of the encroachment of neoliberal restructuring 
of the urban and its governance, and more importantly, on a viable alternative 
and more democratic governance of urban infrastructure.     
6. Conclusions
The disruption of infrastructure and networks by the successive totalitarian and 
neoliberal shocks was crucial for the restructuring of the system and its urban 
infrastructures under a more democratic and reformed—but still neoliberal—
modernization. The imposition of neoliberal policies in Chile and their impact 
on infrastructure exemplifies the relationship between shocks and infrastruc-
tures. These shocks are not just events like natural disasters or technical failures; 
infrastructures are shaped by political and economic shocks, and this combina-
tion of shocks shapes both the way they are operated and how they materialize 
in space, with consequences for both the lives of urban citizens and the use and 
circulation of resources. 
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A shock relates to the attempts to control different material spheres, to discipline 
both population and resources, reshape the socio-natural metabolism of the city, 
and force the population to adapt to the new regime. Here we are dealing with 
two separate but interrelated shocks to infrastructure. The first one is the actual 
coup and the seizing of infrastructures by the military Junta. The second one 
is the neoliberalization of the economic system and in particular of the infra-
structure’s funding, construction, and operation. The 1973 coup in Chile and 
the regime that followed demonstrate how infrastructure—under shock—can 
be simultaneously used against individual freedoms and collective institutions, 
actively contributing to deconstructing democratic forms of social and political 
citizenship, and producing binary social categories of subjects under a friend/foe 
logic. Rather than a mere material product, infrastructure shock appears to be a 
powerful tool for social engineering and political domination, and, as suggested 
by Swyngedouw (2006), not only as a material expression of a power balance, 
but an active element of the material and symbolic assemblage of that power. 
In the case of Chile, the neoliberal shock allowed the new rulers to disrupt and 
dismantle the previous political system, infrastructure, and social networks, and 
impose a new neoliberal economic and constitutional order. But at the same 
time, the very conditions for its success—totalitarianism and massive violation 
of human rights—created an unfavorable political and economic environment 
to attract substantial and continuous investment in urban infrastructure. 
The tension between continuity of the neoliberal policies and pressure for demo-
cratic reforms led to a negotiated political transition, which can be understood 
as a “resilience phase” of infrastructure development. In this phase the consolida-
tion of the new regime was signaled by the boom in infrastructure investment, 
network expansion, market development, and search for legitimization of the 
inherited framework of urban infrastructure development in the needs of an 
accelerated economic growth to fight the high poverty rates left by the previous 
regime. At the same time, the restructuring of urban infrastructure networks led 
to new urban problems and conflicts. Policies of neoliberal shock and neoliberal 
resilience increased the infrastructure standards and diversified the service net-
works at the cost of greater inequality of access to these improved infrastructures, 
as in the case of the transport modes in Santiago. The concession system and 
the liberalization of bus transport and the ensuing restructuring have not solved 
this issue. The Transantiago system appears to be a clear example of an attempt 
to remedy previously ill-conceived policies that in no case addressed the social 
needs of their times, let alone those of future generations. The top-down recon-
figuration of infrastructure in Chile could only be brought about on the back 
of a terror campaign; but in seeking to mold complex socio-technical systems 
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according to ideological solutions—rather than growing organically on relatively 
functioning models—the system has been responding to the consequences of 
the shock with the same rationality inherited from it.
The case of Santiago de Chile speaks, as proposed by Bakker (2005) of the 
imperfect, contradictory, and never accomplished process of nature and social 
domination that permeates urban projects through the reconfiguration of urban 
flows. If infrastructure shocks make the political fabric of urban society visible, 
as Graham (2009) argues, what do they tell us about the incomplete nature of 
such projects and the way time challenges them in unexpected ways? 
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Lead Photograph
Downtown, Los Angeles. This photo shows part of the Downtown train depot, 
and is part of a series entitled One Santa Fe that explores a new housing and 
commercial development in the Downtown Los Angeles Arts District. Located 
across from the Sci-Arc Campus, an architecture school, on its eastern edge, 
One Santa Fe is not the first development in the neighborhood but could rep-
resent the type of developments to come in the near future.  Photograph by  
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